Two cardinally new things
happened at the May parliamentary elections: primarily
the forceful rise of pro-European idea in Serbia,
and then the fact that, after so many years, the
coalition around the Democratic Party beat by
convincing 9.5 percent difference and dethroned
Serbian Radical Party from position of the strongest
political formation in the country. In places
where people lead normal lives, this remarkable
turn would have helped stabilize the situation
palpably; here, however, the situation became
even more tangled. The things steamed up to dramatic
proportions at the first step already, with forming
of the new government. Ferocious scrambling over
some twenty MPs of the Socialist Party of Serbia's
bloc ensued, as the opposing parties strove to
achieve a majority in the new Parliament. After
the election results were announced, the head
of state met with representatives of the adverse
coalitions who, despite their claims, failed to
prove they had the required parliamentary majority.
The search for a new government continued.
At the first glance one might say this was nothing
unusual for political groups fighting for primacy
in government. With us, however, it is not so,
as motivations and models of behavior, ambitions
and fears, are far different from those in civilized
states. Seselj and Nikolic's radicals received
the unexpected election results with apprehension
that they had not only lost a battle, but also
the entire war, and for a longer period of time.
This perspective seriously shook their confidence,
forcing them to try to fix whatever could be fixed.
The initial profiteering qualm of the SPS bloc
as to which side they would join, provoked in
radicals the dark reminiscence of the end of Slobodan
Milosevic's regime, whose fate and defeat they
shared. Their joint fall in 2000 was mostly caused
by election results and citizen's resistance,
but also by the fact that many Milosevic's proxies
had turned their back on him. The experience is
still a nightmare for the Serbian Radical Party
and that is why they are so sensitive when it
comes to loyalty of their natural ally, the SPS
party. That is why they imprinted the process
of winning a post-election partner, a routine
event in any parliamentary democracy, with a distinct
taste of a final confrontation with those opposing
their nationalistic concept.
Though profiting from all the comfortable advantages
of being a "tip of the scale", the SPS
has in reality been imploding quickly during all
these weeks, for various moral and political reasons.
It has been burdened heavily with glaring differences
in the coalition (Palma's announcements he would
stick with the SAA), and even the more serious
threat of a feud within the party. One current
is aware of the need to transform and modernize
the party and join the Socialist International,
the other is sticking stubbornly to Milosevic's
heritage. Dacic himself did not hide that Tadic's
block was closer to him "ideologically",
but the irreconcilable members of his party have
been pulling him to the other side. With a partner
like this, who brings more burden than reliance,
no government can survive for long.
With these elections, Kostunica rounded his nationalistic
evolution and at least the top of the Democratic
Party of Serbia sided comfortably with Seselj's
radicals. Furthermore, he became the main ideologist
of the nationalists' bloc, and in this office
he fervently advocated in public that the coalition
should expand to receive the socialists. Anyway,
this is a logical end of his long career, especially
after 2000, when he clearly confirmed his position
of inveterate opponent of the ICTY and EU accession.
His new political environment is now raising him
to a pedestal of a charismatic leader, planning
for him to resume the role of fallen Slobodan
Milosevic. Beside the metaphysical, all this has
its practical, not to say underground, side -
as having power means eschewing responsibility
for muddled cooperation with military intelligence
service or Security-Information Agency and all
the related consequences. What DSS members will
say to all this, remains to be seen.
The public was in a gloomy mood during the first
dozen days after elections because, though the
strong rise of European idea was confirmed in
the elections, it seemed that the new government
would slip through Tadic's fingers. Then the balance
in the parties' murmurings moved slowly to his
side, though not for sure. Tadic's readiness to
cooperate with the socialists had received different
reactions even before - some assaulted him for
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betraying the original
democratic ideas and abolishing war crimes,
other justified him, saying that pragmatic
and unpopular steps were the price that
had inevitably to be paid in order to
garner a majority.
All this may have passed unnoticed, had
Tadic not again shown himself to be a
person of wavering beliefs and contradictory
decisions. Referring to the DSS and SRS,
he once determinedly announced: "I
am warning the parties that lost the elections
not to play with the electorate's will
by trying to form a government that would
bring Serbia back into the 90's. I will
not allow such a government and I will
prevent it democratically". Two days
later he used a completely different tone
when he said he wanted a government
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"based on national reconciliation" of
those who lead the country after the 90's and
those who lead it after 2000.
The lack of sense in defining limits to possibilities
in a compromise can be fatal for a politician's
fate. This case is not merely about a crisis in
finding a solution for a government, but a crisis
of understanding a model of governing culture,
which was not rare in the history of the Democratic
Party. Djindjic, for instance, was also prone
to making dubious compromises, but his strategic
direction was undisputable. It is different with
Tadic: with the weight of accepted compromises,
he is jeopardizing his strategically European
orientation.
The post-election whirl is the most difficult
for citizens that are attached to their European
choices. They have no dilemma or options and they
worry whether the DS will be able to finally end
with ambiguous politics it has lead for many years.
On the other hand, the past danger in the form
of SRS and DSS, which resemble some militant organizations
hungry for violent revision of election results
and retaliation against any different opinion,
is looming. There will still be jolts and many
heavy political fights.
