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How the supreme government body in Serbia works

Hints of Parliamentarianism

The session of the National Parliament, adjourned in July, was resumed in September: international agreements were ratified, a "new national consensus" was announced and then postponed - what was really going on?
Nebojsa Popov

After the noisy May elections and tumultuous haggling over composition of the new government, the agenda of the Parliamentary session scheduled for 21 July contained the following items: (1) ratification of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union, (2) oil and gas (OG) arrangement with the Russian Federation, (3) eleven loan agreements worth EUR286.5 million and (4) the government's policy on Kosovo and Metohija. The session was interrupted-adjourned at the very opening, without a clear explanation (presumably to avoid the turmoil caused by the arrest of Radovan Karadzic, which took place on that very day). It was resumed on 02 September. After a five-day debate that lasted some 40 hours with around 300 rebuttals, MPs voted for ratification of all agreements (140 voted for the SAA, 214 for the OG), while the last item was removed from the agenda.
As I watched the TV broadcast of the entire course of the session, I will highlight for our readers some important characteristics of the developments, without going into picturesque details that the dailies reported at length.

The conflict of values

In the multitude of rebuttals dominated by personal and party conflicts that created a lot of media buzz, we are interested in the adversarial ideological and political views and, even more, in clashes of internal values of the main actors. Instead of assuming that the "disintegration of all values" has taken place, concrete values become visible by following "yes" and "no" votes in relation to agreements on the agenda.
The reasons for ratification of all agreements, primarily those presented in exposé of Deputy Prime Minister Bozidar Djelic, were prevailingly economic ones, such as contribution to revival and development of the economy, with emphasis placed on utilization of the EU pre-accession funds and the exulting agitation ("let's go, let's go" to the place where the living is better). G 17+ party whip Suzana Grubjesic spoke in a similar manner, but more reasonably, highlighting the polarization: for or against the road to Europe. Aleksandra Jerkov's (League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina) speech took the same course, with particular emphasis on the idiosyncrasy of Vojvodina and its resistance to robbery.
Civilization-related and cultural arguments came from members of the ruling majority. Dragoljub Micunovic (Democratic Party) highlighted the importance of the European road for Serbia, which went beyond economic framework, and emphasized that the majority of Serbian citizens had already moved from the sidetrack. G 17+ MP Sasa Milenic, a philosophy professor in a high school, attempted to prove, knowingly and inspiringly, that foundations for Serbia's road to Europe could be found in Serbian cultural and political history. He stressed that past, present and future should be valued equally and that the European Union is an open-ended project that has a place for value pluralism. This opinion, which is rarely heard in our public, was followed by an ardent discussion that ranged from the commonplace disqualifications for "trying to be smart" or "philosophizing", through counterpoising "orthodox spirituality" against Western-type materialism (Gordana Pop-Lazic, Serbian Radical Party), to claims that he was motivated by treason and hatred against Serbs (Natasa Jovanovic, Serbian Radical Party).
The reasons for rejecting the SAA, beside sneering at the "fairytales about Europe" and Euro-fanatics, and repeated accusations of being "servants and lackeys" of the West, were also the alleged animosity of the western powers toward Serbs and Serbia. This supposedly culminated in the recent wars - the NATO bombing in particular and the acknowledgment of Kosovo's independence by the majority of EU member states, which are now all assailing to "colonize" us. The theory about conspiracy against Serbia was also revived (Slobodan Samardzic, Democratic Party of Serbia). Anti-Serb orientation of the Hague Tribunal was often cited. Radicals added to this all the vile intention to murder their leader Vojislav Seselj in the "casemate".
As regards the agreement with Russia, the radicals and the populists (Democratic Party of Serbia, New Serbia) stressed ideological and political reasons to ratify it: the traditional Slavic and Orthodox ties (Slavism and Russophilia), reliance on its growing power and its expected protection and support in relation to the Kosovo issue. They even expressed readiness to abandon economic rationality and limit the country's sovereignty.
The exit from the utter confrontation was offered by the leader of the Radicals in the Parliament, Tomislav Nikolic, who proposed an amendment to the SAA ratification by inserting a paragraph that would "tie the government down" and obligate all Serbian politicians to defend territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia in any arrangement with the EU. Representatives of the ruling majority accepted this amendment. A "new national compromise" was even announced triumphantly. The compromise was accepted by many MPs, except those from the Democratic Party of Serbia and New Serbia. Support came from the Liberal Democratic Party even. Cedomir Jovanovic saw in this a chance to overcome not only confrontations in the parliament, but also the fatal division of the entire Serbia into proponents and opponents of European integrations.

Power and property
Already in the SAA debate, the issue of management of Serbian resources was opened. There were even suspicions that Serbia was content to provide privileges for the western capital, while questioning the one coming from Russia (Jorgovanka Tabakovic, Serbian Radical Party). The discussion peaked at the OG arrangement, with LDP MPs (Jovanovic, Ostojic, Maras, Micic, Prokic, Korac etc.) as the main participants. They said they supported cooperation with Russia and economic agreements in general, but presented very concrete remarks. They objected that the Russian partner would receive a dominant and monopolistic position, primarily by acquiring a minimum of 51% of shares. Furthermore, they remarked that the NIS price was not market-determined and was highly underestimated. They also noted that the seat of the future company was unknown, which generates the question if the company would be obligated by Serbian laws and what court would be competent to decide in case of disputes, remarking that social program was

missing etc. It is not even certain where the gas pipeline will be placed, or whether it will be a major or a side leg (a small stream), they remarked. Unlike the MPs from the radical and populist parties, which exulted this agreement as "historic", "the guarantee of living for the next hundred years", the liberal opposition believed it was "damaging", "shameful" even, especially because "the sovereignty would be ceded too lightly".

 
King Milan's Street, 1903, Belgrade City Museum
Representatives of the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (Kostres and Jerkov) said that "national interests would be sold shamefully", especially by plundering of Vojvodina. They all demanded concrete explanations from the government, which would help them decide whether to accept the agreement, but received no proper reply.
The polemics only touched on a major issue: who has the authority and responsibility to manage the natural and economic resources of the country? Who is the owner? In the time of SFR Yugoslavia, the constitutional category of "socially-owned property", which was in essence "everyone's but no one's", actually served to hide the usurping property monopoly of the power mongers. Without changes to the constitution that would remove the screens for usurpation and set foundations for private and public property, we have had the "wild privatization", without clear constitutional, legal or moral principles; which has created space in turn for new usurpations. Results of thorough research (by Vesna Pesic and others) showed that new actual monopolies of senior party officials (and tycoons) have been created, as they have distributed power and property like their fiefdoms in proportion to election results. Numerous findings of the Corruption Council, headed by Verica Barac, have supplied convincing proofs of systemic corruption, particularly in the biggest frauds (Sartid, sugar scandal, Nacionalna Stedionica etc.).
A part of the public and authors in this magazine have insisted that the parties gathered around Democratic Opposition of Serbia should keep their promise given in 2000: promptly after fall of the Milosevic's regime, elections would be called for a Constitutional Assembly. The Assembly would adopt a new constitution and thus end the unlawfulness, establish normative and institutional foundations for a normal economy, society and state. However, all four post-Milosevic governments ignored that. A new constitution was adopted late in 2006, but it did not emanate from the expected widest social consensus on property, political, social and cultural foundations of the new constitution - Kosovo and a contest in patriotism were placed in its center, instead. The Democratic Party participated in this with its proclaimed policy of "cohabitation", which was after the latest May elections reinforced with announcements of "national reconciliation" with parties of the former regime, primarily the SPS - the "brotherly left".
*
We may conclude that thanks to certain compromises, the session of the National Parliament was unblocked and completed. Some hints of a more stable system of parliamentarianism were also noted. However, these hints brought no lasting results, as some were annulled even during the session, both by those in power and by the opposition. Even the realization of the ratified agreements is uncertain.
We need not repeat here all the benefits of Serbia's EU accession. It would be suitable, however, to keep an eye on the developments until that happens. The "civil society" propaganda or copying of European standards and laws are not futile, but there will not be much benefit from a new Resava School1 if we are uncertain about the nature of the society emerging here or whether the laws will be respected at all. Vital values are related with real affirmation of parliamentarianism in our own country. It is certain, however, that there can be no parliamentarianism as long as we eschew adopting a constitution that would reliably regulate property forms and relations, norms and institutions. Without it, there remains a wide area of chaotic clashes and confrontations dominated by different fundamentalist and militant ideologies and politics. They have ruled over the past decades and now they stubbornly resist to sanctioning of crimes and robbery. Without stable institutions, primarily the parliament, the only authoritative measure will be the balance of power, a constant scuffle to overpower the other, to reach Dedinje2 or send someone to Zabela3, depending on whose "collection time is due". Beside the real inherited problems, this is all facilitated by a systemic reduction of Serbian political, social and cultural history to its fractions proclaimed by different militant groups as the only Serbian tradition - their ideology and propaganda, in fact (this was evident in the attacks at prudent words of the philosophy professor we quoted). Some aspects of the said reduction have already found their place in critical analyses. Some were suggested by recent investigation of consequences of the regime's confrontation with the "black wave in culture", after 1968.
There are many facts that still have not been revealed, primarily in the area of culture, including concrete values and systems of values. Thorough research, critical reviews and new visions of changes are yet to take place in that area.

1 A copying and translation center set up in the then Resava (now Manasija) Monastery in the 14th century.
2 Elite part of Belgrade
3 A prison in Serbia

 
1st - 31st October 2008
     


Danas
This is an abridged version of the original text published in the Serbian issue of the magazine.

 

 

 

 
 
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